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Abstract 
One of the oldest humanitarian non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the International Committee of 
the Red Cross (ICRC) has long been a cornerstone around which all other humanitarian NGOs are built. 
The ICRC conforms to strict principles regarding their behavior and practices so that they can provide aid 
to those who need it around the globe. As NGOs began using both traditional and social media to their 
advantage to promote certain causes, the media and public began to push back, pressuring humanitarian 
NGOs to adopt some causes or speak out on others. Through analyzing ICRC media communications 
during both the Nigerian Civil War and the conflict in Syria, this research project intends to answer the 
following question: How has the ICRC’s response to media pressures shifted the perception of 
humanitarian neutrality for both NGOs and the public? 
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Introduction 
   Turning on the news can make the world seem like a very bleak place.  Images 
of death and destruction, hatred and anger, are broadcast day and night around the globe, 
informing the members of society who watch about what is going on both far away and 
nearby.  Technology has allowed humans to connect on a level that had never been 
imagined before, and the advent of the age of the internet has only served to increase that 
connectedness.  Before television, the news was relegated to print sources, such as 
newspapers and magazines, which could be read at a person’s leisure.  Pictures that 
illustrated sorrow and loss, happiness and triumph were all limited to the relatively small 
amount of space allocated to them to accompany articles in papers and magazines.  The 
press had a phenomenal amount of power over the national and international conversation 
because they controlled, to an extent, the public’s exposure to and consumption of ideas 
and issues. 
 The introduction and popularization of television in the mid-twentieth century 
expanded the possibilities of human connectedness by expanding the audience and scope 
of news programming.  Television added a method of communication that did not really 
exist previously.  While radio spread information through spoken broadcasts and news 
reels in movie theaters spread information about national and international affairs through 
narrated moving pictures, television introduced a potent blend of the accessibility of radio 
and the imagery of news reels.  The immediacy of TV introduced an urgency to society’s 
consciousness with regards to world issues.  Perhaps the most famous example of the 
power of television is during the Vietnam War, where Americans saw, for the first time, 
live images of the brutality of war broadcast into their living rooms every night after they 
P a g e  | 2 
 
ate dinner.  The nightly news became an American tradition as people sat down every 
evening at around six o’clock to allow themselves to be educated about what was going 
on in the world at the moment.   
 Finally, in the first decade of the twenty-first century, the proliferation of the 
news has been revolutionized by the advent of social media.  Companies like Twitter and 
Facebook led the way by putting the news at nearly every person’s fingertips at all times 
via smartphone apps and notifications.  People no longer have to wait for print 
newspapers to hit newsstands or for the nightly news broadcast to inform them what 
happened around the world.  Now, people everywhere are notified of events as soon as 
they happen.  Even traditional print newspapers such as The New York Times and The 
Washington Post have online papers and apps that appeal to the generation of people who 
grew up getting information from the internet and not from the TV or print media, such 
as papers or magazines.   
Social media has intensified the culture of immediacy surrounding the news in a 
way that no other mode of information communication really had prior to this era.  
People are able to curate their own newsfeeds based on their interests, but at the end of 
the day, the ubiquity of trending hashtags make it increasingly difficult to not have at 
least a passing knowledge of what is happening in the world.  Additionally, social media 
has made images of human pain, suffering, joy, and blessing significantly more 
accessible on a global scale.  Where such pictures and videos were before reserved to the 
front pages of newspapers or a five minute blurb in the news, now those photos are front 
and center on people’s social media newsfeeds all the time. 
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 As the media landscape shifted in the last century, so too did society’s 
consciousness.  Due in part to the increasing connectedness brought about by the 
globalization of the media in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, the humanitarian 
spirit of society as a whole has become more apparent.  While at times still ignored, large 
scale human suffering has at other times been met by large scale human kindness, often 
in the form of aid from a humanitarian non-governmental organization.  The number of 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in existence has greatly expanded since the turn 
of the twentieth century, which is particularly the case with humanitarian NGOs.  The 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which was founded in 1863 by Henri 
Dunant, is widely considered the first humanitarian NGO.  Working for several decades 
in relative obscurity, in the latter half of the twentieth century, the ICRC became the 
touchstone of humanitarian NGOs. 
Founded on seven core principles, including most importantly neutrality, the 
ICRC has a long, historically complex relationship with the media.  Their dedication to 
remaining neutral during conflict in the face of extreme misery often caused by another 
party in the conflict makes it extremely difficult to navigate how the public is made 
aware of the issues with which the ICRC deals.  This difficulty is not limited to the 
ICRC, but rather is a problem that many other humanitarian organizations share.  Since 
the ICRC is the baseline for humanitarian NGOs, neutrality has become a defining 
characteristic of humanitarian NGOs in general.  How each humanitarian organization 
interprets that principle in spite of the changing media landscape is, in part, what sets 
them apart from each other. 
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The ICRC’s history with the media is long, complex, and, in places, well-
criticized.  All of the organization’s choices with regards to media have to do with how 
the organization interprets neutrality in the context of the conflict and the media 
landscape.  How the ICRC interacted with the media in the beginning of the twentieth 
century is different from how the organization interacted with the media in the mid-
twentieth century, which is different from how the organization interacts with the media 
in the present moment.  By studying how the ICRC works with the media during 
conflicts, one can learn a lot about how the organization interprets neutrality, and whether 
the perceptions of that principle has changed over time.   
The Holocaust most significantly shaped the way the ICRC manages how its 
principles influence the organization’s interactions with the media.  The ICRC’s strict 
neutrality and consequent silence led to criticism after World War II when it was revealed 
they knew about what was going on in Hitler’s concentration camps but did not do 
anything to stop the Holocaust.  Considered by the organization to be its biggest failure, 
the ICRC felt bound into inaction by its tradition of neutrality, Swiss background, and 
lack of legal basis for action.1  Deciding not to speak out on the Holocaust is consistent 
with the founding ICRC principles, but perhaps not with the intentions of the 
organization.  The ICRC’s principle of neutrality dictated that aid workers go about their 
jobs of protecting the victims of violence as best they could in any given situation, which, 
in the case of the Holocaust, was not very reassuring.  ICRC volunteers attempted, “to 
improve the conditions in the labor and death camps (whatever that might mean, in this 
                                                          
1 “History of the ICRC,” International Committee of the Red Cross, October 10, 2016, 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/who-we-are/history/overview-section-history-icrc.htm. 
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context).”2  For an international community that demanded the Nuremburg Trials – a 
series of military tribunals with the specific purpose of punishing the Nazis for their war 
crimes – attempting to improve the conditions of concentration camps was not a 
satisfactory response to the knowledge of their existence.  
 However, as a 1948 ICRC booklet stated, “‘For the Committee to protest publicly 
would have been not only to outstep its functions, but also to lose thereby all chance of 
pursuing them by creating an immediate breach with the government concerned.’”3  This 
quote demonstrates that the ICRC believed that neutrality was essential to the 
organization’s ability to do its work because without neutrality, especially in Nazi 
Germany, the organization would not be allowed to enter the country.  This indicates a 
sort of humanitarian political calculus wherein the ICRC determined that it would be 
more beneficial for the victims of violence to have a neutral organization that would not 
speak out about the atrocities it witnessed to ensure its helpful presence in the country 
than for the victims of violence to have a non-neutral organization that was kicked out of 
the country and therefore not allowed to provide aid because it shed public light on the 
atrocities it witnessed.  In the case of the Holocaust, the ICRC decided that that calculus 
proved wrong; however, that does not mean that they believe the system is broken.  It 
indicates that they should have made a different decision in that specific situation.  In 
response, the organization did not radically alter their principles, but rather adjusted how 
they interpret those principles with regards to reporting on humanitarian crises in the 
media. 
                                                          
2 Michael Barnett, Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2011), 136. 
3 Quoted in Barnett, Empire of Humanity, 136. 
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The Holocaust marks the moment that the ICRC moved away from the black and 
white, strict, and classic conception of neutrality and towards the fine line between 
maintaining the principle while also informing the media and the public about world 
conflicts.  The more involved the ICRC gets with the media, the finer that line becomes.  
Through studying the ICRC’s mission during the Nigerian Civil War in the 1960s, the 
ICRC’s current mission in Syria, and their relations with the media during both conflicts, 
I will argue in this paper that increasing media pressure over time has contributed to the 
shifting of the ICRC principle of neutrality, in practice if not in fact.   
Overview:  Humanitarian NGOs and the Media 
 The goal of all humanitarian NGOs is the same, regardless of their name or 
affiliations.  Humanitarianism, at its core, deals with providing aid to those in need.  How 
that aid gets distributed varies from organization to organization, but the most important 
thing to remember about humanitarian NGOs is that their end game is always to help 
people.  Humanitarianism has evolved over time, meaning that there are multiple ways to 
possibly define and understand the term.  In the early days, the term was defined solely 
based on the ICRC understanding of the concept, as they were the only organization of 
that type that really existed.  According to the ICRC definition, humanitarianism is, “the 
impartial, neutral, and independent provision of relief to victims of conflict and natural 
disasters.”4  As the ICRC was the first humanitarian organization founded, their 
definition set a precedent, not only for other humanitarian organization, but for the 
concept of humanitarianism itself.  The ICRC definition of humanitarianism became the 
                                                          
4 Barnett, Empire of Humanity, 10. 
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widely-accepted version, still used today in many books on humanitarianism and 
humanitarian intervention.5  
The problem with this definition is that it has remained stagnant since its 
inception, despite tremendous changes in world politics, culture, and warfare.  The 
tightening of the international community under the umbrella of intergovernmental 
organizations (IGOs) like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European 
Union (EU), and the United Nations (UN) as well as the increasing numbers of 
humanitarian organizations have changed the culture of humanitarianism itself.  For 
example, the UN created the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in order 
to efficiently respond to international crises, whereas traditionally organizations would 
have been expected to coordinate their response on their own.  Such shifts in 
humanitarian culture require that the definition of humanitarianism shift so that it better 
suits the international community as it looks today.  Humanitarian organizations argue 
amongst themselves as to what the definition should look like, normally along a spectrum 
that allows for, “any form of intervention against any form of human suffering,” on one 
end, and the ICRC definition on the other end.6  For the purposes of this paper, I will 
operate under a definition that is somewhere in the middle, arguing that humanitarianism, 
“aspires to keep people alive, to expand their opportunities, and to give them greater 
control of their fate,” by providing assistance across borders with an eye to protecting and 
improving humanity.7  This definition distinguishes humanitarianism based on the goal of 
                                                          
5 Barnett, Empire of Humanity, 10. 
6 Johnathan Moore, Hard Choices: Moral Dilemmas in Humanitarian Intervention (Lanham, MD:  
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 1988), 16. 
7 Barnett, Empire of Humanity, 10-11. 
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an organization rather than the ICRC definition, which distinguishes itself based on the 
methods an organization uses to provide aid. 
Humanitarian NGOs often work together to achieve a common goal in conflict 
zones or issue areas, from issues as general as autonomous weapons bans to warzones as 
specific as the current conflict in Syria.  Different humanitarian organizations, such as the 
ICRC and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), come together to promote a cause and 
provide aid, despite their differences.  That the vast community of humanitarian NGOs 
collaborate with each other is unsurprising, especially considering the proximity of their 
connections.8  As the first humanitarian NGO, the ICRC has in one way or another 
inspired the creation of most, if not all, humanitarian organizations that have arisen in the 
century and half since.  Humanitarian NGOs form a network of organizations that, while 
operating independent of one another, are most successful when they work together.  An 
important function of networks is the generation of information that helps everyone, 
including governments and other institutions that are not part of the network.9  Typically 
in advocacy networks, the largest, most central organization determines the direction of 
the network’s conversation. 10  As the oldest and largest humanitarian NGO, the ICRC is 
the most central hub of the humanitarian network.  Therefore, the ICRC is perhaps the 
largest issue gatekeeper in the community and, thus has the most power when it comes to 
selecting issues that the community will address. 
                                                          
8 Pamela Aall, Daniel Miltenberger, and Thomas G. Weiss, Guide to IGOs, NGOs, and the Military in 
Peace and Relief Operations (Washington D.C., United States Institute of Peace Press, 2000), 114. 
9 Margaret E. Keck and Katherine Sikkink, Activists Among Borders: Advocacy Networks in 
International Politics (Ithaca:  Cornell University Press, 1998), 194. 
10 Charli Carpenter, “Lost” Causes: Agenda Vetting in Global Issue Networks and the Shaping of 
Human Security (Ithaca:  Cornell University Press, 2014), 31.  
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The ICRC’s centrality in the humanitarian network and, consequently, its 
importance as a gatekeeper increases the relevance of the organization’s methods for 
interacting with the media.  The most central organization in the network not only wields 
the most power within the network, but also typically wields the most power outside the 
network, as centrality gives the organization credibility, which is an extremely important 
form of currency in the larger international community.11  The more credible an 
organization, the more likely that an issue pushed by the organization will be brought to 
the attention of the international community, and hopefully the rest of society.  
Humanitarian organizations build their credibility by cultivating trust and consistency.  In 
terms of NGOs, the trustworthiness and consistency that build credibility require, at least 
in part, that the organization follow through on its mandate and maintain its principles 
while doing so.  A key principle that must be upheld to build a humanitarian NGO’s 
credibility is neutrality. 
Neutrality, a central principle to not only the ICRC but also other humanitarian 
organizations, is defined as avoiding acting in favor of one side or another in any 
conflict.12 Neutrality is important because, in theory, it keeps the humanitarian workers 
out of harm’s way. Through not favoring any side, organizations attempt to secure 
protection from both sides.  Additionally, neutrality is important because it appeases the 
governments of the countries in which the organization operates.  Remaining neutral in 
times of conflict allows the organization to maintain the trust of all fighting parties, 
which allows them to greatest opportunity to fulfill their mandate.  Without neutrality, 
                                                          
11 Carpenter, “Lost” Causes, 29. 
12 Barnett, Empire of Humanity, 2. 
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humanitarian NGOs would be more likely to either lose the permission of the host 
country to operate in the country or would not gain entry into the country in the first 
place.  Should that happen, the people to whom the humanitarian organizations were 
trying to provide aid would go without the much needed aid. 
The definition of neutrality is not particularly contentious, at least not in the same 
way that the definition of humanitarianism is. What makes neutrality a source of conflict 
is the weight or priority given to neutrality over helping people.  For example, the 
ICRC’s code of silence, predicated on neutrality, clashes with MSF’s principle of 
témoinage, which reserves MSF’s right to report on the atrocities that their volunteers 
witness.  Different humanitarian NGOs balance their desire for neutrality and their 
mandate to provide aid differently, and tensions arise when those discrepancies occur, 
particularly in situations where NGOs are collaborating with each other.  Additionally, 
neutrality is contentious in the international community because the principle, aimed in 
part at protecting aid workers, has not been working.  Humanitarian organizations have 
been dealing with frequent attacks on humanitarian space and aid workers, which are 
supposed to be protected because of the existence of the principle of neutrality.13   
The operational definitions of humanitarianism and neutrality are crucial because 
they directly influence how humanitarian NGOs interact with the media.  The media is a 
crucial source of connection between specialized agencies and organizations and the rest 
of the society.  Humanitarian NGOs are funded through donations, and so public opinion 
matters to those organizations, which strive to, “generate and sustain media attention,” to 
                                                          
13 Thomas G. Weiss, Humanitarian Intervention:  Ideas in Action (Cambridge:  Polity Press, 2012), 
79-80. 
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convince, “donors that their donations are going to worthwhile causes.”14  Through the 
media, citizens of all different countries can keep track of what is going on in the world.  
The expansion of media platforms in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries has created 
a system so extensive that it is often broken down into two different types – the 
traditional media and the new media.  Traditional media includes platforms such as 
television, radio, and printed materials.  New media includes platforms based around the 
internet such as blogs, websites, and social media.   
In order to keep up with the global media climate, NGOs have had to adjust how 
they interact with the different forms of media and monitor how those different forms of 
media interact with them.  Different media types have different agendas, which all 
require different responses from NGOs.  For example, journalists typically seek to 
uncover the truth and inform the public, with a tendency to be more formal.  That 
formality allows NGOs to control the story by determining which facts to release and 
how to frame those facts.  Social media, on the other hand, is a form of communication 
where the public interacts directly with the NGOs.  The direct and instantaneous nature of 
social media makes it harder for NGOs to control the story.  The advent of the internet 
and social media broke down, “limitations of time and space, effectively reconfiguring 
our perceptions of place, community, and belonging.”15  NGOs get bombarded daily with 
messages on platforms like Twitter, where the public demands action and asks questions.  
Where before questions regarding action, inaction, and decision-making came 
exclusively from members of the press corps who asked their questions during press 
                                                          
14 Aall, Miltenberger, and Weiss, Guide to NGOs, IGOs, and the Military, 100. 
15 D. Robert DeChaine, Global Humanitarianism: NGOs and the Crafting of Community (Lanham, 
MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2005), 14. 
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conferences or through formal inquiries, since the popularization of social media, anyone 
with a working internet connection could ask any question at any time.  How 
humanitarian NGOs respond to those demands reveals information about their principles 
and practices. 
NGOs use both traditional and social media to spread their agenda, at times 
choosing issues based on their marketability or choosing issues which already had 
significant, “expert, media, and celebrity attention.”16  Choosing abstract issues to bring 
to the attention of the world is an important part of the mission of some humanitarian 
NGOs, but that does not truly test the principles of the organization the way decision-
making in conflict zones does.  Maintaining neutrality is at its most difficult and crucial 
for humanitarian NGOs in conflict situations where humanitarian aid is necessary.  At 
times, humanitarian workers witness brutal acts, but because of the principle of 
neutrality, they are not allowed to speak to the public or the media about their 
experiences.  This implicit, neutrality-bred code of silence has led some workers to argue 
humanitarian NGOs should report the atrocities they see, such as the ICRC doctors who 
became so disillusioned by the organization’s silence that they broke away and founded 
another humanitarian NGO, which became MSF.  The tension between when to stay 
silent, when to report horrendous acts, and how to remain as carefully neutral as possible 
while reporting the most horrendous acts has always been a difficult, fine line that 
humanitarian NGOs must walk.  When humanitarian space is targeted in attacks, the line 
                                                          
16 Carpenter, “Lost Causes”, 43. 
P a g e  | 13 
 
becomes even finer as humanitarian organizations speak out to protect civilians and 
volunteers.   
In both the Nigerian Civil War and the current conflict in Syria, which are the 
cases treated in this thesis, the ICRC has had to deal with numerous attacks on 
humanitarian space, such as hospitals and aid convoys.  The intentional targeting of 
humanitarian space represents a significant challenge to humanitarian neutrality, and 
NGOs have developed three general approaches for dealing with such attacks, each of 
which require varying levels of speaking out.17  During the Nigerian Civil War, the 
method the ICRC utilized when it needed to speak out was press releases, as that was the 
most effective way to communicate with the public at the time.  Throughout the conflict 
in Syria, the ICRC has used a mixture of traditional and new media to interact with the 
public, combining press releases and tweets to create a complex, mixed media presence 
designed for a more public and diverse media climate.  A careful analysis of ICRC press 
releases from both the Nigerian Civil War and the conflict in Syria as well as tweets from 
the Syria era illustrate that the ICRC choses to speak out with the strongest force in 
traditional media formats, like press releases, where the organization maintains a larger 
measure of control over their message.  Nevertheless, regardless of the media method that 
is used, speaking out, “erodes perceptions of neutrality.”18  The subsequent sections of 
this paper will observe how the ICRC walked the line balancing neutrality and speaking 
out during both the Nigerian Civil War and the conflict in Syria, and analyze the impact 
their careful balancing act has had on the definition and practice of neutrality. 
                                                          
17 Jennifer Leaning, “The Dilemma of Neutrality,” Prehospital and Disaster Medicine 22, no. 5 
(September-October 2007):  420. 
18 Leaning, “The Dilemma of Neutrality,” 420. 
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The International Committee of the Red Cross in the Nigerian 
Civil War 
 In 1967, after two political coups in as many years, fighting broke out in Nigeria 
between the Nigerian Federal government and the secessionist state of Biafra, which was 
located in the eastern part of Nigeria.  Most European countries believed that the 
skirmishes would simply result in a ten day conflict in Nigeria and that the Federal 
government would force Biafra to rejoin Nigeria.  Instead, what resulted was a nearly 
three year war that left thousands of Biafrans dead of starvation.  The media broke the 
news of the man-made famine with photographs of gaunt Biafran children while the 
ICRC struggled to come up with an adequate, organized response under the pressure.  
Ultimately, the relatively short Nigerian Civil War, sometimes referred to as the Biafran 
Civil War, led to a significant change in the culture of the media, the culture of 
humanitarian aid, and how those two cultures interact. 
 In the aftermath of the Holocaust, the ICRC retreated into itself, limiting its 
activities during significant conflicts to their most traditional, least resource demanding 
programs – detainee visits and providing support to the National Red Cross and Crescent 
Societies.19  The fact that the ICRC took a step back in terms of the types of aid it 
provided after the Holocaust debacle is understandable.  It makes sense that the 
organization would want to scale back its programs and take some time to evaluate the 
criticisms they received in the wake of World War II.  However, the tempered approach 
                                                          
19 Marie-Luce Desgrandchamps, “’Organising the unpredictable’: the Nigeria-Biafra war and its 
impact on the ICRC” International Review of the Red Cross 94, no. 888 (Winter 2012): 1412. 
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the ICRC took in the years between the end of World War II and the Nigerian Civil War 
dramatically impacted the organization’s preparedness for the relatively large-scale 
conflict in which it found itself engaged in 1967.  Thus, as early as 1945, the negative 
media attention that came as a result of the ICRC’s decisions during the Holocaust began 
to impact how the organization looked at their principles and the NGO’s ability to act 
effectively in the future.   
 The Nigerian Civil War and the subsequent famine in Biafra came to the attention 
of the world through the traditional media, which publicized the conflict in a way that had 
not quite been seen before that moment.  The Nigerian Civil War itself, a conflict steeped 
in centuries-old ethnic and religious tensions exacerbated by British colonialism, went 
largely unnoticed by the public until the newspapers and other forms of print media 
began circulating pictures of emaciated Biafran children.  Unlike during the American 
war in Vietnam, which was heavily impacted by the proliferation of television broadcasts, 
news of the famine in Biafra was spearheaded by the written press due to the difficulties 
and intricacies of filming in Africa.20  Those images brought the Nigerian Federal 
government’s blockade of Biafra to the forefront of the public’s consciousness and, for 
perhaps the first time ever, the media was used to combat a manmade famine.21   
The media broke the news of the famine to the international community in the 
summer of 1968.22  After its introduction to the public, concern for the Nigerian Civil 
War only grew.  In 1969, the Nigerian Civil War was such a large story that John Lennon 
                                                          
20 Paul Harrison and Robin Palmer, News Out of Africa: Biafra to Band Aid (London: Hilary Shipman 
Limited, 1986), 33. 
21 Harrison and Palmer, News Out of Africa, 38. 
22 Harrison and Palmer, News Out of Africa, 28. 
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returned his membership in the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire (MBE) to 
protest the British involvement in the civil war on the side of the Nigerian Federal 
Government.  The interest in the Nigerian Civil War can be seen in the dramatic increase 
of ICRC press releases regarding the war between the first mention of the conflict in 
1967 to the end of 1968.  In 1967, the ICRC published only six press releases regarding 
their action in the Nigerian conflict.  In 1968, that number spiked to forty-five press 
releases, forty-one of which were released in July or later.  The intense media attention 
that surrounded this particular conflict subjected the ICRC to deeper media scrutiny than 
it had faced since the Holocaust, and it is clear the ICRC responded to that scrutiny in one 
way or another through increasing the frequency of their communication with the media 
through press releases. 
 The first mention of the Nigerian Civil War in ICRC press releases occurs on July 
11, 1967.  In it, the ICRC briefly mentions that it has sent, “two standard assortment of 
medicines and bandages,” to Lagos, “at the request of the ICRC delegate general of 
Africa, Mr. Georg Hoffman,” however it does not mention any action that was occurring 
in Nigeria or Biafra at the time.23  The focus on the ICRC response rather than the actual 
events of the civil war illustrates how the ICRC attempted to maintain the principle of 
neutrality in the beginning of the conflict.  Rather than focusing on what the two sides 
were doing to each other, the ICRC merely reported that it was sending supplies to 
provide aid.  By avoiding discussing the conflict itself, the ICRC manages to stay away 
from any mentions of the politics of the conflict, which keeps the organization neutral in 
                                                          
23 The International Committee of the Red Cross, “The ICRC and the Nigerian conflict,” press release 
no. 843b, July 11, 1967. 
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the eyes of not only the public, but also the Nigerian Federal Government and the 
Biafrans.   
The tone of the press release is carefully maintained and pointedly neutral, using 
as few words as possible to describe the ICRC action.  Because of the ICRC’s strict 
policy of neutrality, one of the best ways to decipher how the organization is thinking of 
a certain event or action is through analyzing the tone of official documents.  Often the 
language and subsequently the tone that an organization uses to describe an event or 
decision can reveal more information about the event or decision than the words that they 
use to describe it.  The simple statement of fact and relatively modest shipment of 
supplies in this first press release relating to the Nigerian Civil War indicates, first of all, 
that the ICRC, much like the rest of Europe, did not anticipate the conflict to be a long 
one.  Secondly, the brevity of this press release illustrates how carefully the ICRC 
maintained their neutrality during this period.  The organization did not want to be 
perceived as taking sides in any conflict, particularly this one that was not supposed to 
last longer than a fortnight.  They kept their message short and to the point as a way of 
avoiding any semblance of taking a side in what most of Europe considered another 
simple African skirmish.24 
The issue that complicated the Nigerian Civil War in the eyes of the West was 
that Biafra was made up of one ethnic group – the Igbos.  Centuries-old cultural, 
religious, and ethnic tensions existed between the Igbos and the other ethnic groups in 
Nigeria, and the end of British colonialism served as the hot coals that would set those 
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tensions on fire and led to Biafra’s secession from the Nigerian Federal Government in 
1967.  During colonialism, British missionaries, who brought with them their Christian 
religion and Western education, were very successful in the Igbo-populated southern 
region of Nigeria.25  The northern region of Nigeria was predominantly Muslim, and so 
the British used a hands-off approach to colonizing northern Nigeria, forbidding Christian 
missionaries to enter the region, thus cutting that area of the country off from Western 
religion and education.26  When the British exited Nigeria, the better educated Igbo 
people migrated from the south to the north to fill the positions left open by the British 
colonizers.  This mass migration caused significant resentment amongst Northerners, and 
the violence rooted in that resentment led to the Igbo people relocating en masse to 
Biafra, where they proceeded to secede from the Nigerian Federal Government.  Because 
the manmade famine during the Nigerian Civil War targeted only the Igbos, the press 
who broke the story to the public labelled the effects of the Nigerian Federal 
Government’s blockade of Biafra a genocide, which caused an international uproar.27 
In all of its press releases regarding their mission during the Nigerian Civil War, 
the ICRC never once refers to the blockade or the famine as genocide, which illustrates 
their dedication to neutrality.  To label either the blockade or the famine as genocide 
would be, in essence, to choose a side, which would be partial.  Genocide is a crime 
against humanity, and as such when any government or group is accused of genocide, 
they are justifiably punished for their actions.  If the ICRC were to have publically 
declared the Nigerian Civil War a genocide, then they would have condemned the 
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Nigerian Federal Government and taken Biafra’s side in the war.  In the same way that 
the ICRC did not discuss genocide during the Holocaust, the organization refrained from 
using that very heavy word during the Nigerian Civil War. 
However, the ICRC learned a lesson from the criticism of their silence after the 
Holocaust.  While they never declared the Nigerian Civil War to be a genocide despite 
media pressure to do so, the organization published many press releases during the war 
that challenged classic conceptions of neutrality.  In 1968 and 1969, which is when the 
ICRC responded to the bulk of media pressure, the organization published 109 press 
releases regarding the Nigerian Civil War.  Seven times in the span of those two years, 
the ICRC issued more than one press release in a day, and more often than not, they 
published press releases about the Nigerian Civil War on consecutive days.  Issuing 109 
press releases in the span of two years indicates the organization’s shift from silence to 
speaking out despite their claim to value classic neutrality.  The ICRC’s neutral silence 
had gotten them in trouble during the Holocaust, and they were not going to repeat the 
same mistake again.  However, by adopting a more vocal posture during the Nigerian 
Civil War, the organization opened itself up to the potential for more media scrutiny and 
more opportunities to make a mistake regarding the maintenance of their neutrality 
during the conflict.  
Part of the media pressure on the ICRC was sponsored by Biafra itself.  Colonel 
Ojukwu, the leader of Biafra, hired Markpress, a Geneva-based marketing company, to 
promote their cause outside Nigeria.28  Markpress, which also held the Chrysler account 
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at the time, was an extremely talented agency that had incredible success promoting 
Biafra in Europe, bombarding Britain with over 700 press releases throughout the course 
of the war.29  When he hired Markpress, Ojukwu made a shrewd decision that gave 
Biafra a Cyrano-esque voice in the West.  The information Markpress was releasing 
aroused public opinion in favor of Biafra, which indirectly put pressure on the ICRC.  
The goal of any good public relations campaign, which is essentially what Markpress was 
running on behalf of Biafra, is to sway public opinion.  When Markpress succeeded in 
broadening the audience who sympathized with Biafra, that audience protested against 
the injustices done unto the Biafrans by the Nigerian Federal Government.  As the largest 
humanitarian NGOs engaged in the conflict, the ICRC responded to the pressure 
generated from the massive upswing in public interest and investment in the Nigerian 
Civil War by focusing its media presence almost solely on the civil war for the duration 
of the conflict. 
A fairly significant number of the ICRC press releases reveal the amount and type 
of humanitarian aid that the ICRC provided to both Nigeria and Biafra during the war.  
More press releases announce the visits of high ranking ICRC officials to the conflict 
zones.  While at first glance, those types of press releases do not compromise the 
principles of the ICRC, they still indicate something about the ICRC during this time 
period.  The organization reminded the world throughout the conflict that they provided 
support to those who needed it in both regions.  While that in and of itself does not 
breach neutrality, the constant reminders of ICRC action call back to the backlash the 
ICRC received in the wake of the Holocaust, where they were rightfully accused of not 
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saying anything about the genocide.30  During the Nigeria conflict, the ICRC made sure 
that no one would be able to accuse the organization of not providing aid or keeping the 
world updated on the situation. 
However, some people within the ICRC believed that the organization was still 
not properly balancing its mandate with its principle of neutrality.  The grisly images of 
the effects of starvation in Igbo children and adults were overwhelming for some doctors, 
who resented the ICRC’s commitment to neutrality when the Nigerian government was 
so clearly responsible for the atrocities the doctors were now seeing firsthand.31  The 
final straw for a group of those doctors was an attack by the Nigerian army on a medical 
clinic.  Unsure of what to do in light of the oncoming army, the doctors radioed the Red 
Cross headquarters only to be told that they needed to leave the clinic and the villagers 
while the doctors moved on to safety.32  Enraged by even the idea that they would leave 
innocent civilians to an advancing army, the French doctors disobeyed the command and 
stayed long enough to witness the soldiers slaughter the villagers.33  Those doctors went 
on to found MSF, where they created the principle of témoinage to allow MSF workers 
and volunteers to speak out against the atrocities they witness in a way that the workers 
and volunteers from the ICRC are not permitted. 
The ICRC faced several challenges as it attempted to provide humanitarian aid 
through the blockade, the most frustrating of which was the bombing of Red Cross 
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hospitals and aid flights by the Nigerian Federal Government.  The protection of 
humanitarian spaces, such as hospitals and flights marked with the Red Cross symbol is 
one of the core tenants of the Geneva Conventions.34  As the ICRC reminded Nigeria in a 
press release, as a signatory to the Geneva Conventions, the government was bound by 
international humanitarian law to protect humanitarian spaces, particularly hospitals 
clearly marked with the Red Cross symbol of humanitarianism.35 
The first press release regarding the bombing of Red Cross space comes on 
August 20, 1968.  A total of two short paragraphs, the communication reports that, “the 
ICRC has been informed by its delegates in Biafra that the neutralised airstrip placed 
under its control…has been bombed on August 20 by aircrafts of the federal armed forces 
of Nigeria.”36  The strict retelling of facts in this case again highlights the ICRC’s 
reticence to appear to favor one side or the other.  The language they use in this press 
release is carefully guarded, and they make a point of saying that they contacted the 
Nigerian federal government about the bombing and are, “awaiting an urgent clarification 
from the Federal Military Government of Nigeria.”37  Allowing the Nigerian Federal 
Government to respond to the attack is a symptom of ICRC neutrality.  They do not want 
to accuse the government of attacking humanitarian space because an accusation based 
only on the claims of one side of the conflict could be construed as taking a side.   
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The ICRC’s cautious optimism that the Nigerian Federal Government would be 
able to explain what happened with the bombing of a neutral airstrip indicates the 
cautious optimism and disappointment inherent in humanitarianism.  The way 
humanitarian organizations speak in times of crisis indicates that they believe that 
countries in the international community will respect and protect their citizens and their 
rights, but the NGOs exist in the case that some countries violate those rights.  
Consequently, press releases for humanitarian NGOs like the ICRC are laced with 
language that indicates disappointment while trying to avoid implicating any of the 
parties to the conflict in order to respect those countries’ sovereignty.  Walking the fine 
line between general disappointment at the situation and an implied accusation against 
one party to a conflict is difficult, and the more the ICRC suffers losses, the less patient 
the organization becomes and the more accusatory and frustrated the language of those 
communications becomes. 
As 1968 drew to a close, ICRC press releases reveal that the head of the 
delegation in Biafra reported the Nigerian air force bombing of the Red Cross hospital 
called Awo-Omamma.38  The release indicates the time of the attack and then hints at the 
Geneva Conventions by clearly stating, “The hospital was clearly marked with several 
red crosses.  Moreover, the hospital is far from any military objective and there were no 
troops in the region.”39  The veiled reference to the Geneva Conventions trends 
throughout all similar Red Cross press releases, focusing attention again and again on the 
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fact that the warring parties are not respecting an international agreement to which 
Nigeria, at the very least, is party.  This time, the ICRC goes so far as to report that they, 
“immediately protested to the Nigerian authorities against this violation of the Geneva 
Conventions.”40   
While not indicting the Nigerian government for the action, the length and 
language of this press release is stronger than that which discussed the bombing of the 
neutralized airstrip.  After already appealing to the Nigerian Federal Government once 
regarding the Geneva Conventions, they patiently refer to it again in this press release.  
However, in this case, the use of the verb “protest” indicates a slightly stronger response 
on the part of the ICRC.  A protestation against an act connotes not only blame, but also 
more explicitly implies that the ICRC has a problem, specifically with the comportment 
of the Nigerian military in the conflict.  Such a distinct complaint against one, specific 
party to the conflict leans toward a breach of neutrality.  Thus, this press release reveals 
how the ICRC attempted to bend their own rules in order to fit the demands of the public 
during the Nigerian Civil War.  They acknowledge to the public that there was a military 
attack against a protected group of civilians in a humanitarian space, as well as their 
displeasure with that military attack.  During the Holocaust, such a claim would have 
been a breach of neutrality, but the organization’s willingness to make that claim during 
the Nigerian Civil War illustrates how principles shifted due to the public criticism after 
the Holocaust. 
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Finally, as what was expected to be a ten day dispute dragged into its second year, 
the ICRC became incredibly frustrated.  The organization could never get the Nigerian 
Federal Government and the Biafran authorities to agree to a formal system to for getting 
relief into the country, which was an implication of ICRC neutrality that left the 
organization struggling to fulfill its main function during the conflict.41  Beginning as 
early as January 1969, the diction of ICRC press releases becomes progressively sharper, 
impatient, and pointed.   
On January 7, the ICRC reported that the hospital at Awo-Omamma was attacked 
by Nigerian aircraft again, this time leading to four deaths and two seriously wounded.  
Again, the organization highlights that the hospital was clearly marked with the Red 
Cross symbol.  The four paragraph long release ends with the simple, but powerful 
sentence, “This is the second time within a month that this hospital has been deliberately 
attacked by Nigerian aircraft.”42  “Deliberate” is perhaps the strongest word in both this 
communication and the communications prior.  “Deliberate” removes any doubt about 
the guilt of the Nigerian military.  In the beginning, the ICRC left room for the Nigerian 
Federal Government to explain itself and their reasons for the attack. By 1969, the ICRC 
placed the blame directly on the Nigerian government without any chance for 
explanation.  The classic ICRC definition of neutrality should not allow the organization 
to publicly shame one party during a conflict for their actions the way the ICRC does 
when it blames the Nigerian government for continuously violating the Geneva 
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Conventions.  Public shaming would count as partiality toward the side that is not being 
publicly shamed.  However, the ICRC dispensed with that technicality and instead chose 
to label the Nigerian military attack on Awo-Omamma as “deliberate”, in spite of what 
that word insinuates in this context. 
Ultimately, the ICRC’s vocalism during the Nigerian Civil War, which was 
revolutionary for the organization at the time, became the new norm for managing 
neutrality during conflicts.  The increasingly sharp, pointed language the organization 
began to use as the conflict drew on functioned to keep the media updated, but it did not 
fit nicely into the spirit of neutrality.  Additionally, the organization struggled to raise the 
funds necessary to provide the required aid in the region.  Though in the end the ICRC 
ceded control of humanitarian aid during the Nigerian War to different agencies, they had 
already begun to the process of expanding their interaction with the media beyond the 
confines of the classic definition of neutrality. 
The International Committee of the Red Cross and the 
Conflict in Syria 
 The Nigerian Civil War taught the ICRC that it needed to make structural 
changes, and in 1970, the organization began to do some self-reflection and updated its 
structure to better serve the ever-expanding demand for aid.  However, even as this 
structural shift occurred, the organization did not change its principles.  The founding 
tenants of the ICRC remained the same, and the ICRC continued to operate with 
neutrality just as it had before Biafra.  While the ICRC did not formally update its 
definition of neutrality, the operational definition, which began to shift during the 
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Nigerian Civil War, continued to shift as media pressures changed and increased with the 
introduction of television and the new media, including the internet and social media.  In 
the present day, the ICRC continues to do its work in war-torn areas in what it believes to 
be a neutral silence, as evidenced by their actions in Syria during the on-going war.  In 
reality, however, the way the ICRC operates in the present day is incongruent with the 
classic, strict denotation of neutrality that the ICRC still technically maintains. 
The current war in Syria began in 2011 with revolts against Syria’s president, 
Bashar al-Assad, inspired by the Arab Spring.43  As the conflict in Syria descended into 
civil war with Western powers and terrorist organizations such as ISIS taking sides, the 
ICRC entered the country to provide its typical, but much needed, humanitarian services.  
The nature of the conflict in Syria, aided by the modernization of war in the decades 
following the Nigerian Civil War, rendered Syria an urban war, where soldiers and rebels 
are attacking and sieging cities populated by civilians.  In the seven year span of the war 
in Syria, over fifty percent of the population has been displaced, and over 465,000 
Syrians have been killed in the crosshairs of conflict.44  Despite its strict neutrality, the 
ICRC dealt with increasingly common attacks on hospitals, warehouses, and resource 
convoys, a problem that continues to plague the humanitarian efforts in Syria as the civil 
war enters its seventh year.  The attacks affect not only the civilians who require the 
medical supplies, food, and water provided by the ICRC, but also the aid workers 
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themselves.  As long as hospitals and convoys are being bombed, aid workers are in the 
line of fire, which the ICRC has long tried to avoid by remaining strictly neutral. 
 While the print media broke the news of the famine in Biafra, news of the conflict 
in Syria was never really broken in the same sense of the phrase due to the nature of the 
twenty-first century media climate.  At the turn of the century, the media was on the cusp 
of a rather abrupt, profound, and transformative typological shift.  The internet 
revolutionized the way the media works, in a way that had never happened before.  Some 
may point to the television coverage of Vietnam as a moment that revolutionized the 
media, but even that moment did not cause as intense a shift as the internet.  Television 
coverage of the war in Vietnam forced TV into the forefront of media consciousness, but 
the traditional media adjusted to accept TV without significantly changing the overall 
media culture.  Television provided added the element of video to the media, which 
broadened what the public got to witness, but it did not change who was shaping the 
media agenda.45  Formal news outlets worked with governments and NGOs to report 
what was happening in the world.  This dependent relationship allowed governments and 
NGOs a measure of control over how their stories were being told, and reports often 
came hours or even days after the event occurred because it took time for the news to 
travel through all the sources. 
Conversely, the advent of the age of internet changed how the media agenda got 
shaped as well as who shaped that agenda, which is why the internet marks the shift from 
traditional media to new media.  The internet is an instantaneous form of communication 
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that is open to anyone who has a connection, which does not seem that spectacular in a 
world that is accustomed to it; however, in the first decade of its existence, it was a 
revelation.  It connected not only individuals around the world, but also groups of people 
across the globe that otherwise might not have interacted.  Those connections, through 
social media outlets such as Twitter and Instagram, make it possible for people to share 
their own stories with each other without the intercession of traditional media outlets.46  
With the liberalization of information channels comes increased pressure from the public 
on individuals, governments, and NGOs.  Social media gives the public at large a forum 
where they can instantly share their thoughts and displeasures on a certain issue in the 
news in a way that never truly existed before.  People take full advantage of their ability 
to share their opinion on social media platforms like Twitter every day.   
This forum pressures organizations, particularly humanitarian NGOs, to respond 
to events and issues.  Humanitarian organizations like the ICRC tell the world that their 
mandate is to help people who need it, and because of social media, the public has the 
ability to see first-hand the instant people need help without waiting for the traditional 
media to inform them.  In turn, the public can see when the ICRC is fulfilling its mandate 
as well as when it is not.  When the ICRC is not acting quickly enough, individuals can 
use social media to criticize their perceived inaction.  Public opinion matters to the ICRC 
because the organization is sustained through donation.  The popularization of Twitter 
has forced the ICRC to respond much more rapidly and frequently than in the past. 
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The ICRC official account, @ICRC, tweets to its 2.27 million followers at least 
three to four times a day, varying across issues and events.  ICRC satellite accounts, such 
as @ICRC_sy (the ICRC delegation in Syria’s account) or @ICRC_dc (the ICRC 
account for the regional delegation for United States and Canada) tweet a further three or 
four times a day on average.  All those accounts work together, retweeting and favoriting 
each other’s tweets to spread any given message to a wider audience.  More often than 
not accompanied by pictures or videos, the text of the tweets are strong and succinct.  By 
its very nature, Twitter does not grant organizations the space to qualify their statements.  
Limited at first to merely 140 characters until the website expanded to 280 characters in 
2017, Twitter’s brevity forces organizations like the ICRC to condense a very careful and 
considered opinion into a sentence or two, all the while maintaining the classic definition 
of neutrality. 
The ICRC’s choices on Twitter in the context of the Syrian Civil War illustrate 
how the organization’s operational definition of neutrality has shifted, even as their 
classic definition has not.  As with the press releases during the Nigerian Civil War, the 
ICRC’s first tweets regarding the conflict in Syria simply report on ICRC supply 
shipments.  The first ICRC tweet regarding Syria, in fact, refers to the ICRC’s plan, “to 
facilitate transfer of 10,000 tonnes of apples from occupied Golan to Syria.”47  The 
simple, straightforward nature of this tweet mirrors the language found in the early press 
release from the Nigeria conflict, and illustrates that, regardless of the decades that had 
passed, the beginnings of ICRC engagement in conflicts remain the same. 
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 As the conflict progressed, however, the language in the tweets becomes more 
frustrated and outspoken, particularly surrounding attacks on civilians and humanitarian 
space.  In August 2013, a sarin gas attack killed hundreds of civilians in the suburbs of 
Damascus.48  The possession and use of chemical weapons is strictly forbidden under the 
Chemical Weapons Convention, which entered into force in 1997.  The nerve gas attacks 
in Damascus, according to Western powers, “could only have been carried out by Syria’s 
government, but the government blamed rebel forces.”49  Since chemical weapons are 
banned and therefore not easy to come by, it makes little to no sense to believe the Syrian 
government claims that the sarin used in the attacks belong to rebel forces.  President 
Assad of Syria seemed to corroborate this basic logic when he agreed, after US military 
pressure, to the, “complete removal and destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons 
arsenal.”50  Such an agreement can, and perhaps should, be considered an implicit 
admission of guilt on the part of the Syrian government.  A government as unstable as the 
one run by Assad would not agree to give up an important, albeit illegal, part of the 
military arsenal unless they seriously feared an attack by a foreign superpower.  And 
Syria would not seriously fear such an attack unless the government knew they were 
guilty of that which they were accused. 
 On August 29, 2013, the ICRC tweeted five times.  Two of the tweets informed 
their followers about the International Day of the Disappeared on August 30th.  The other 
three tweets made statements, with varying degrees of specificity, on the sarin attacks in 
Syria and the resulting precarious humanitarian situation.  The first tweet of the day, 
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published at 5:59 AM Eastern Standard Time, simply reads, “100,000 people have 
reportedly been killed.  Hundreds dying every day.  Suffering in #Syria has reached 
unprecedented levels.  No end in sight.”51  Short, sweet, and to the point, this tweet lays 
out the death toll in Syria while perhaps hinting at the sarin attack.  The language in the 
second and last sentence of this tweet are particularly powerful, although not so much 
that they are outside the realm of what has come to be expected of the ICRC, especially 
after the Nigerian Civil War.  The use of the word “suffering” indicates the ICRC’s use 
of a pathetic appeal, targeting the empathy of its followers.  Readers are meant to feel 
outraged by the humanitarian problem in Syria.  The phrase “no end in sight” serves to 
add to the outrage.  Worded rather ominously, “no end in sight” tells followers not only 
that there will be continuous human suffering at the hands of other humans far into the 
future, but hints that the ICRC must remain engaged in the conflict in order to do its best 
to alleviate the suffering.  If there is no end in sight with an ICRC presence in the 
country, how much worse would the civilians in Syria be without the humanitarian 
organization there to provide aid? 
 The second tweet of that day, published at 6:26 AM Eastern Standard Time, refers 
directly to the sarin attacks, saying, “We urge all parties to the conflict in #Syria to never, 
in any circumstances, use chemical weapons.  These are strictly prohibited under 
#IHL.”52  Such a rapid response to the attacks illustrates the pace at which the ICRC and 
other organizations must respond to world events because of social media.  The world 
knew of the attacks rapidly, and thus the ICRC felt pressure to respond equally as rapidly.  
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Before social media, the organization would have perhaps a day to craft a comprehensive 
and carefully worded statement regarding any sort of conflict, and they would most likely 
have had time to gather a little more information of their own.  In contrast, the existence 
of the ICRC Twitter account means that as soon as the world knows about an issue, the 
ICRC is accessible and should be ready to respond.  In this case, the ICRC issued a pretty 
standard response, tempering their language to make sure that they are not prematurely 
blaming one side or the other for the sarin attack, but instead referring all parties to 
international humanitarian laws regarding chemical weapons.   
 Attached to the third and final tweet about Syria from that day is a video, the 
caption of which read, “Watch our official statement on the alarming #humanitarian 
situation in #Syria…#media.”53  By linking their video to their tweet, the ICRC 
circumvents Twitter’s essence of brevity.  In so doing, the organization indicates that 
though Twitter is a useful space to raise awareness for issues and organizations as well as 
interact directly with the general public, the platform is not truly conducive for the type 
of message the ICRC needs to release in the wake of a great and complex humanitarian 
strategy.   
The video itself is only a little more than a minute long, opening with a line full of 
strong language regarding the “human tragedy with alarming consequences,” in Syria.  
After the first sentence though, the ICRC spokesperson goes on to repeat almost verbatim 
the tweet from earlier in the day about the “unprecedented” levels of suffering with “no 
end in sight.”  Later in the video, she again repeats almost verbatim the second tweet 
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regarding the illegality of chemical weapons under international humanitarian law.  The 
most telling part of the video comes in the middle, when the spokesperson mentions that 
there are several areas of Syria which have been sealed off for months, and to which the 
ICRC had not been granted access.  The way the video is structured makes it seem like 
the fact that they’ve been shut out of parts of Syria is secondary to the warning against 
the use of chemical weapons.  However, the organization has already reminded the 
parties to the conflict not to violate international humanitarian law.  The real point of the 
video, then, should be that the ICRC does not have access to some parts of Syria.  The 
isolation of those parts of Syria, much like the blockade during the Nigerian Civil War, 
was ultimately the fault of the Syrian government.  While the ICRC cannot directly 
blame the Syrian government for the humanitarian crisis in those regions, the fact that the 
organization is calling attention to that abuse of power illustrates a way that they can 
undermine the choices of the Syrian government while still technically maintaining 
neutrality. 
The war in Syria has been plagued not only by attacks on civilians, but also by 
attacks on humanitarian spaces and workers, and it is in those moments when the ICRC 
becomes the most outspoken, towing the line of neutrality.  On September 20, 2016, the 
ICRC published a press release regarding an attack on an aid convoy travelling into 
Aleppo carrying resources such as food, water, and medical supplies intended to help the 
citizens in the war-torn, rebel-held city that is one of the main targets of air strikes.  The 
press release is worded very strongly, stating the organization was, “outraged,” and, 
“devastated,” by the deaths of the twenty civilians and one ICRC worker who were killed 
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in the attack and condemning any further attacks on humanitarian spaces as violating 
international humanitarian law.54   
Mirroring the situation in Biafra, the ICRC stressed the importance of upholding 
the Geneva Conventions and protecting its aid workers in this press release when it said, 
“’Failing to respect and protect humanitarian workers and structures might have serious 
repercussion on ongoing humanitarian operations in the country.”55  The use of the 
phrase “serious repercussions” in that sentence is particularly noteworthy, as it imparts an 
ominous and almost threatening tone, which is uncommon for the ICRC.   The 
organization informing the international community, particularly the parties responsible 
for the attacks, that the ICRC will not tolerate attacks on humanitarian aid workers and 
humanitarian space, to the extent that it would exit the conflict and leave the civilians 
who need aid is astonishing and unprecedented.  Whether or not the organization would 
actually leave the conflict in Syria remains to be seen; however, even the threat of such 
an action seems to counter the most basic mandate of the ICRC, which is to provide aid 
to the people who need it most. 
The ICRC Twitter account opened the day on September 20, 2016, by tweeting a 
link to that press release regarding the attack on the humanitarian convoy.  Included in 
that tweet is a close-up image of a destroyed box of supplies bearing the famous Red 
Cross symbol as well as a Red Crescent symbol and the word “ICRC” in both English 
and Arabic.  The box is riddled with holes, covered in sand and dirt, with bottles of 
                                                          
54 The International Committee of the Red Cross, “Syria – Attack on humanitarian convoy is an attack 
on humanity,” news release, September 20, 2016, https://www.icrc.org/en/document/syria-attack-
humanitarian-convoy-attack-humanity. 
55 The International Committee of the Red Cross, “Syria – Attack on humanitarian convoy is an attack 
on humanity.” 
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medicine falling out of the broken sides of the box.56  The imagery of destruction is an 
important tool for the ICRC.  They can show the bombed out houses, hospitals with walls 
collapsing, and sad, tired children, and evoke an understanding of tragedy in the viewers 
without having to even use words.  The ICRC expects the public to take those images and 
the carefully, yet strongly, worded messages in the tweets and the press releases and 
pressure governments into following international humanitarian law.   
This expectation presupposes an understanding of who is causing the suffering.  If 
the public doesn’t know where to put pressure, then their outrage will be ineffective.  
While not explicitly violating neutrality themselves, the ICRC is still, in a sense, calling 
out the different parties to the conflict and asking the public to hold them accountable for 
their actions.  The ICRC points out only the effects of a certain party’s action without 
mentioning the party; however, it is impossible for that party to not know that the ICRC 
is criticizing them.  The public’s access to information via both traditional and new media 
means that it is more likely than not that the public also knows who the ICRC is 
criticizing, even if the organization does not name names.  The immediacy of social 
media makes it easier for the general public to make connections between news of an 
attack and the party who perpetrated the act, as well as what the ICRC had to say about 
the attack itself.  The operational line between violating neutrality and maintaining the 
principle, then, has gotten thinner. 
 
                                                          
56 ICRC (@ICRC), Twitter post, September 20, 2016, 5:10 a.m., 
https://twitter.com/ICRC/status/778204803382046720. 
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Analysis and Conclusion 
 Through analyzing the ICRC’s media communications during the Nigerian Civil 
War and the conflict in Syria, some trends emerge regarding how the ICRC manages its 
principles through shifts in the media climate.  The ICRC’s continued media use indicates 
that it believes its actions are within the bounds of neutrality; however, those actions do 
not line up with the classic definition of that term. What the ICRC means when it talks 
about neutrality today is very different from what the organization meant when it was 
founded.  The undeniable impact of the post-Holocaust criticism is felt throughout ICRC 
communications, eliminating strict silence from the operating definition of neutrality 
without introducing that change into the classic definition. 
 As evidenced in press releases for both the Nigerian Civil War and the conflict in 
Syria, the ICRC is most likely to speak out in situations where humanitarian space is 
being threatened or attacked.  I highlighted specific press releases regarding a hospital 
bombing during the Nigerian Civil War and an attack on a humanitarian convoy during 
the conflict in Syria, but the ICRC consistently uses similar language in press releases 
regarding attacks on humanitarian space.  The desire to protect humanitarian space and 
humanitarian workers was one of the reasons that the ICRC instituted the policy of 
neutrality in the first place, and the fact that the ICRC is most willing to toe the line of 
that principle when it is not successfully protecting humanitarianism is noteworthy.   
 The trends that appear from analyzing the language of ICRC communications 
suggest that the media form in which the ICRC is most consistently outspoken is press 
releases.  In both the Nigerian Civil War and the conflict in Syria, the ICRC’s use of 
P a g e  | 38 
 
language in press releases pushes the boundaries of neutrality father than the classic 
definition would seem to allow.  During the Nigerian Civil War, the ICRC’s press 
releases implicated the Nigerian Federal Government in attacks on humanitarian space, 
and during the conflict in Syria, the strongest language of disappointment and threats can 
be found in press releases rather than social media.  Press releases give organizations 
significant control over how their story is presented to world media agencies, which in 
turn grants organizations like the ICRC some security while pushing the boundary of 
neutrality, as they have the time and the space in press releases to temper the strongest 
language just enough to ensure that the organization remains just on the right side of 
operational neutrality.   
Unlike press releases, new media forms, particularly social media, are 
characterized by the public’s response to statements, a response that is both unpredictable 
and uncontrollable.57  Just as it is easier to safely push the boundaries of neutrality when 
there is time and space to temper the language of a statement, it is more difficult to safely 
push the boundaries of neutrality when there is neither time nor space to temper the 
language of a statement – or Tweet.  Consequently, it is easier for humanitarian NGOs 
like the ICRC to craft relatively cautious statements for shorter, uncontrollable Twitter 
and save the truly pointed, outspoken statements for longer, controllable press releases. 
 The brevity and omnipresence of social media draws the ICRC closer to the 
tenuous line between maintaining neutrality and informing the public about their actions 
in a conflict, particularly when ICRC actions respond to attacks by a certain party against 
                                                          
57 Braun and Gillespie, “Hosting the Public Discourse, Hosting the Public,” 383. 
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humanitarian space.  The omnipresence of social media makes it significantly easier for 
organizations like the ICRC to promote their causes, but it also projects ICRC statements 
around the world immediately for public consumption and comment, which makes the 
ICRC’s margin of error with regards to neutrality that much smaller.58  Any statement 
with overly strong language would be sent around the world instantly, and once 
something is said on social media, no amount of clarification can make the world forget 
that it was said.  The ICRC should always be wary of saying something that accidentally 
or unintentionally crosses the fine line between neutrality.  Once that line is crossed on 
social media, it will be extremely difficult for the organization to step back again. 
 Strong language and an increasingly active media presence highlight the ICRC’s 
shift from the formal, classic definition of neutrality upon which the organization was 
founded and towards an informal, operational definition of the principle.  Evidenced by 
the ICRC’s silence during the Holocaust, the classic, formal conception of neutrality 
demanded an independence that the ICRC ultimately realized was impractical for a non-
profit, non-governmental organization which depends on donations to sustain itself.  As 
sometimes the only link to the general public in serious humanitarian conflicts, the public 
indicated after the Holocaust that part of the ICRC’s mandate in helping those who 
needed it should be to inform the public so that the world can also know what is going on 
and properly support the organization. 
 Throughout the media communications in both the Nigerian Civil War and the 
conflict in Syria, one can see the ICRC bend the classic definition of neutrality to better 
                                                          
58 George Lazaroiu, “The Social Construction of Participatory Media Technologies,” Contemporary 
Readings in Law and Social Justice 6, no. 1 (2014):  107. 
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fit their operations during the conflict.  During the Nigerian Civil War, that meant 
introducing strong, suggestive language into press releases to deal with the increased 
media attention from the proliferation of images of starving children and claims of 
“genocide”.  At times, the ICRC went as far as to implicate the Nigerian Federal 
Government in attacking humanitarian space.  Under the classic definition of neutrality, 
neither the language the organization began using nor the implication of the guilt of one 
party would be acceptable, as those statements could be considered partisan and thus not 
neutral.  However, the media scrutiny against the ICRC after the Holocaust, the media 
attention on Biafra, and the nature of the civil war created a situation in which the 
ICRC’s classic definition would not suffice, and so the organization stretched the terms 
of that definition to fit the operation.  The same has occurred during the conflict in Syria.  
The classic definition of neutrality does not fit in with the immediacy and brevity of 
social media or the nature of modern warfare in Syria, where everyone, civilian or 
otherwise, is a potential target.  Adapting their already tailored definition to fit new media 
styles and specific situations indicates that, in practice, the ICRC holds on only to the 
spirit of neutrality, and interprets the principle in the context of the current situation. 
 The ever-increasing attacks on hospitals and humanitarian convoys illustrate in 
gruesome detail the shrinking of humanitarian space.  The increasing lack of respect for 
humanitarian space in recent years is a symptom of the changing nature of war coupled, 
perhaps, with the confusion surrounding how humanitarian organizations like the ICRC 
put their principles into practice.  The classic definition of neutrality which the ICRC 
cites no longer represents the principle in action and thus is no longer a fitting 
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definition.59  The goal of neutrality, in part, is to protect humanitarian space and make aid 
available to those in need.  However, if all the parties to a conflict as well as the 
organizations who are providing aid do not have a mutual understanding and expectation 
regarding what neutrality actually looks like during a conflict, then it makes it much 
easier for a party to a conflict to claim breach of neutrality as justification for attacking 
humanitarian space.  This problem has become evident in modern conflicts like Syria 
where, “non-state actors [...] do not believe that there is any such thing as a neutral 
humanitarian.”60  In a worldview where neutral humanitarians do not exist, then there is 
no reason to respect humanitarian space, and all the silence in the world will not protect 
aid workers and hospitals.  However, as symbols of an outside, “moral order”, it remains 
crucial that organizations maintain their principles as examples of integrity in the conflict 
zone.61 
 The tightrope of neutrality and media presence upon which humanitarian NGOs 
must balance grows ever thinner.  The goals which inform the principle of neutrality – 
ensuring the provision of aid and the protection of humanitarian space – are admirable 
and crucial to the function of humanitarian NGOs like the ICRC.  However, as evidenced 
by the Nigerian Civil War and the conflict in Syria, the classic definition of neutrality is 
antiquated.  The ICRC has bent the classic definition of neutrality into a sort of 
operational definition to fit the current conflict and media climate, always keeping in 
mind the spirit of the principle of neutrality.  Ultimately, the classic definition desperately 
needs updating to match the operational definitions of neutrality that have evolved over 
                                                          
59 Leaning, “The Dilemma of Neutrality,” 419. 
60 Leaning, “The Dilemma of Neutrality,” 419. 
61 Leaning, “The Dilemma of Neutrality,” 421. 
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time.  In order to avoid misunderstandings in an increasingly mediatized, the ICRC 
should adjust its classic, formal definition of neutrality to more closely match its 
informal, operational definition.  By adjusting the formal to match the informal, then all 
parties to a conflict will know without question what to expect from the ICRC with 
regards to aid and media presence, which will encourage state and non-state actors to 
respect humanitarian space again.  
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